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Abstract
Traffic congestion games abstract away from
the costs of junctions in transport networks,
yet, in urban environments, these often impact
journey times significantly. In this paper we
equip congestion games with traffic lights, mod-
elled as junction-based waiting cycles, therefore
enabling more realistic route planning strate-
gies. Using the SUMO simulator, we show that
our modelling choices coincide with realistic
routing behaviours, in particular, that drivers’
decisions about route choices are based on the
proportion of red light time for their direction
of travel. Drawing upon the experimental re-
sults, we show that the effects of the notori-
ous Braess’ paradox can be avoided in theory
and significantly reduced in practice, by allo-
cating the appropriate traffic light cycles along
a transport network.
1 Introduction
Congestion games are the standard framework of algo-
rithmic game theory employed to study the equilibria
of traffic flows [Roughgarden, 2005]. They are non-
cooperative games of perfect information where self-
interested actors choose sets of available resources, e.g.,
roads, and where the cost of each resource depends on
its overall usage.
A well-known phenomenon occurring in these games
is Braess’ paradox [Braess, 1968], i.e., the existence of
traffic networks that suffer from the increase of total cost
when the cost of an available resource strictly decreases.
While Braess’ paradox is an important mathemat-
ical result, its existence relies on rather constraining
modelling assumptions, as congestion games abstract
away from a number of important features of real-world
road networks. Notably, their cost functions assume no
clashes between antagonistic traffic flows which, in the
real-world, are typically resolved by interdependent con-
trol mechanisms such as traffic lights.
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Traffic lights are themselves an important object of
research in Artificial Intelligence, as understanding their
best configuration is paramount for the branch of AI
concerned with optimising traffic [Chouhan and Banda,
2018; Laszka et al., 2016; Lopez et al., 2018; Pol and
Oliehoek, 2016]. However, their effect on the traffic flow
equilibria is yet to be understood.
Our contribution. Here, we formulate a congestion
game model equipped with junction-based waiting cy-
cles, encoding traffic lights, and prove that the equilib-
ria of such games exist and are essentially unique. Using
SUMO, the state of the art traffic simulation software,
we show that the model is built on realistic assumptions
in terms of the induced cost function and on realistic pre-
dictions of routing, as well. We then show that it is pos-
sible to use traffic lights to make a Braess-like network
more efficient, noting that inaccurate configurations can
lead to suboptimal network routing instead.
Related literature. Congestion games have been a
reference framework for transportation research since
Wardrop [Wardrop, 1952], who established the condi-
tions for a system equilibrium to exist such that all trav-
ellers have minimum and equal costs, leading to further
important applications in the traffic domain [Fisk, 1980;
Pas and Principio, 1997; Powell and Sheffi, 1982; Yao et
al., 2019; Zhao et al., 2014].
Following Braess’ seminal work [Braess, 1968], the
topic of routing paradoxes has been extensively explored
[Murchland, 1970; Pas and Principio, 1997; Zhao et al.,
2014]. Pas and Principio [Pas and Principio, 1997] clas-
sified demand constraints and linear cost functions that
cause Braess’ paradox on Braess-like networks. Milch-
taich [Milchtaich, 2006] singled out the topological condi-
tions for an undirected network to be immune to Braess’
paradox for a single population. In asymmetric games,
conditions for network immunity were proposed by Chen
et al. [Chen et al., 2015]. More generally, Epstein et al.
[Epstein et al., 2009] examined topologies in which ev-
ery Nash equilibrium is socially optimal. Although we
are restricting our analysis to perfect information games,
there are connections with [Meir and Parkes, 2018], who
consider congestion games where players have subjective
utilities and proved bounds on the impact bias players
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can have on the equilibria.
The study of real-world traffic networks heavily relies
on computer-aided simulation. In this field, Simulation
of Urban Mobility (SUMO) [Lopez et al., 2018] is the
main open source traffic simulation software often used
in transportation research [Chouhan and Banda, 2018;
Laszka et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2018; Lopez et al., 2018].
SUMO, which is our software of reference, is compatible
with developing and testing intelligent traffic lights, and
it is frequently used for the implementation and test-
ing of reinforcement learning models [Pol and Oliehoek,
2016; Yang and Tan, 2017].
Paper structure. Section 2 introduces the basic re-
sults and definitions of congestion games needed later on.
Section 3 formulates the novel game model and shows
that equilibria exist and are essentially unique. In Sec-
tion 4, we use SUMO simulations to illustrate that the
game has realistic properties and assumptions. Finally,
in Section 5 we show how realistic traffic light models
can be used to reduce selfish routing inefficiencies.
2 Mathematical preliminaries
Let N = {1, ..., n} be a nonempty finite set of agent
populations, each travelling along a directed graph G =
(V,E) between an origin o ∈ V and destination d ∈ V .
Agents belonging to the same population are assumed to
have the same origin-destination (henceforth OD) pair.
The demand for a population i, i.e., its size, is di ≥ 0.
Each population i is assumed to control a nonempty fi-
nite resource set Ei ⊆ E, intuitively the edges they can
potentially travel on, given their OD pair. More for-
mally, we assume each Ei to be made by those resources
that are used in at least one of the population’s poten-
tial OD routes, corresponding to strategy sets Si ⊆ 2Ei .
We assume that each e ∈ E, i.e., each edge, can be
written as an ordered pair of nodes of V . Moreover,
we assume that resource cost functions, i.e., functions
of the form ce : R≥0 → R≥0 ∪ {∞} such that e ∈ E,
are continuous, non-decreasing and non-negative. Fi-
nally, we define a (nonatomic) congestion game as a tu-
pleM = (N, (Ei), (Si), (ce), (di)), with i ∈ N and e ∈ E.
We stress that even if real-world traffic works with a dis-
crete number of individuals, the analysis can often be
significantly simplified, while keeping sufficient general-
ity, using the non-atomic form, which assumes players
controlling negligible amount of flow. The outcome of
all players of population i choosing strategies leads to
a strategy distribution xi satisfying
∑
s∈Si x
i
s = di and
xis ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ Si.
Call a strategy distribution or outcome x = (xi)i∈N
feasible if
∑
s∈Si x
i
s = di, ∀i ∈ N . Denote more-
over the load on e in an outcome x to be fe(x) =∑
i∈N
∑
s∈Si x
i
s1s(e) where 1 is the indicator function.
Moreover, in x, let a player from population i receive a
cost function C(s,x) = Ci(s,x) =
∑
e∈s ce(fe(x)) when
selecting strategy s ∈ Si.
A user equilibrium (UE), also known as Wardrop equi-
librium, is a strategy distribution x such that every
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Figure 1: Braess’ paradox on the Wheatstone network. When
d = 1, the social cost of travel is 3
2
before and 2 after reducing
the costs of the middle edge.
player of every population chooses a strategy with min-
imum cost. More formally, a UE is a strategy distri-
bution x such that the following inequality holds true:∑
e∈si ce(fe(x)) ≤
∑
e∈s′i ce(fe(x)) for all si, s
′
i ∈ Si such
that xisi > 0, ∀i ∈ N .
The social cost SC(x) of x is the total cost incurred
by all players, i.e.,
SC(x) =
∑
i∈N
Ci(x)di =
∑
e∈E
fe(x)ce(fe(x))
Strategy distribution x is said to be the social op-
timum (SO) if it solves the following minimisation
problem: minx SC(x) such that
∑
si∈Si x
si
i = di,∀i ∈
N, xsii ≥ 0. It is often the case that the SO solution is
different to the UE solution, as players want to maximise
their own individual utility. The Price of Anarchy (PoA)
is the ratio between the social cost of an SO outcome and
the worst social cost of a UE. For UE y,
PoA =
arg minx SC(x)
arg maxy SC(y)
Braess’ paradox arises when the cost of a resource
is strictly decreased yet results in a strict increase in
the social cost of the equilibria. This can be ob-
served in the Wheatstone network in Figure 1. A
set of systems (E,Si)i∈N admits Braess’ paradox if
there are two (nonatomic) congestion games M =
(N,E, (Si), (ce), (di)) and M′ = (N,E, (Si), (c′e), (d′i)),
with i ∈ N and e ∈ E, for which c′e(t) ≤ ce(t), ∀t ≥ 0
and d′i ≤ di, ∀i ∈ N , and two UE x and x′, such that
SC(x) < SC(x′). If no such M and M′ exist, then we
say that M is immune to Braess’ paradox.
A network G = (V,E) is a directed graph with a max-
imum of one edge between any ordered pair of nodes and
no self-loops. For a directed edge uv ∈ E where u, v ∈ V ,
we understand that uv starts at u and ends at v. The
in-degree of a node v ∈ V , vin, is the number of edges
that terminate there. A path is an ordered collection of
edges such that adjacent pairs of edges share a node.
If a network is two-terminal then there is a single ori-
gin and destination pair for players to travel between.
A two-terminal network is series-parallel if it is either
a single edge, or it is composed recursively by joining
two series-parallel networks in series or in parallel. The
following result, used later on, outlines the conditions for
a network to be immune to Braess’ paradox.
Theorem 1 ([Milchtaich, 2006]). A two-terminal net-
work G is immune to Braess’ paradox if and only if G is
series parallel.
3 Congestion games with traffic lights
In networks where traffic lights exist at junctions, the
cost of waiting can be intuitively divided in two parts:
the cost of using the preceding edge if there was no traffic
light at its end and the additional cost that the traffic
light imposes on the driver. This section deals with the
problem of establishing the exact form of such division.
Formally, we decompose the expected travel time of
an edge ce, into the expected travel time c¯e that would
occur from traveling across e, and the expected waiting
time we that occurs at its end. The cost function for any
edge e can therefore be written as ce = c¯e + we. Note
that an edge which does not end in a traffic light has
we = 0.
A traffic light cycle is formed of repeated phases of
green and red light when traffic is either serviced or not:
each direction of travel has a cycle of ter red seconds
and teg green seconds. Furthermore, between the phase
changes there is a period of amber light to warn drivers
of the change. We assume that the amber cycles have
a constant time (in our simulation we set this to 3 sec-
onds). The amber light at the end of a green cycle is
included in teg and the amber cycle at the end of a red
cycle is included in tr. At the end of every edge there
exists a probability pe =
ter
ter+t
e
g
∈ [0, 1] that there will be
a red traffic light when this node is reached. The wait-
ing time at a traffic light is a function of pe as well as
congestion x.
In general, the cost of waiting at a traffic light is also
dependent on congestion. Here, however, we make the
key assumption that we can separate the effects of con-
gestion at a traffic light from that of normal travel. Tech-
nically, we write the cost function of using an edge as
ce(x, pe) = c¯e(x) +we(x, pe). Furthermore, we make the
following simplifying assumptions. We assume driving
congestion functions c¯e : R≥0 → R≥0 ∪ {∞} to be con-
tinuous, non-decreasing and non-negative, while traffic
light waiting functions we : R≥0 × [0, 1] → R≥0 ∪ {∞}
to be continuous, non-negative and non-decreasing in x.
Moreover, we assume that if pe = 0, then we(x, 0) = 0
and if pe ∈ (0, 1] then we(x, pe) > 0.
As will be clear from the experiments in Section 4, our
assumptions are not only technically desirable but also
justified empirically. In fact they isolate the natural cost
functions for congestion games with control mechanisms
as emerging from the microscopic traffic simulation.
Given all the above, we define a traffic light conges-
tion game as a tuple M = (N, (Ei), (Si), (pe), (ce), (di))
where e ∈ E, i ∈ N . A traffic light user equilibrium
(TLUE) is a strategy distribution x such that all play-
ers choose a strategy they expect to be minimum cost:
∀i ∈ N and s, s′ ∈ Si such that xis > 0, we have
Ci(s,x) ≤ Ci(s′,x). Note that a UE is a special case of
a TLUE where the traffic lights are always green upon
arrival.
As standard with the perfect information treatment
of congestion games, let us now assume everyone is
aware of the probabilities pe — this can for example
be learned from past experience or through intelligent
vehicles. Then a strategy distribution x is a TLUE if
and only if ∀s ∈ Si such that xis > 0:
Ci(x) = min
s∈Si
Ci(s,x)
The following result follows.
Proposition 1. Feasible strategy distribution x is a
TLUE solution if, and only if, for any feasible x˜:
C(x)(x− x˜) ≤ 0
Proof. Suppose that x is a TLUE. Let population i play
strategy s in x: xis = di. Then any strategy s
′ ∈ Si
that has a higher cost than Ci(s,x) does not occur in a
TLUE.
Ci(s
′,x∼i) > Ci(s,x∼i)⇒ xis′ = 0
Any feasible x˜ can be written as a deviation from x by
a set of population M ⊆ N : x˜ = (s1, s2, ..., sm,x∼M ).
Hence, any other feasible flow has a route cost at least
as high as x.
x˜C(x) ≥ xC(x) ∀x˜
Now suppose that the converse is true, that there exists
a feasible x˜ with cost less than that of x:
∃x′ > 0, C(x˜) < C(x).
Then there exists a set of populations M whose devia-
tions create this distribution: x˜ = (s1, ..., sm,x∼M ). If
those populations reroute their flow along these cheaper
routes then it will reduce the total cost by C(x)x −
C(x˜)x˜ > 0. Thus, x˜C(x) < xC(x). So the inequality
does not hold if x is not a TLUE. Hence, the statements
are equivalent.
From Proposition 1 we can readily derive that for any
TLUE solution x and any feasible x˜:
C(x)(x˜− x) ≥ 0
Now we can write the following derivation:∑
i∈N
∑
s∈Si
Ci(s,x)(x˜
i
s − xis) ≥ 0
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈Si
∑
e∈s
ce(fe(x))(x˜
i
s − xis) ≥ 0∑
i∈N
∑
s∈Si
∑
e∈s
[c¯e(fe(x)) + we(fe(x), pe)](x˜
i
s − xis) ≥ 0∑
e∈E
∑
i∈N
∑
s∈Si
[c¯e(fe(x)) + we(fe(x), pe)](x˜
i
s − xis) ≥ 0∑
e∈E
[c¯e(fe(x)) + we(fe(x), pe)](fe(x˜)− fe(xis)) ≥ 0
This is equivalent to
min
x
∑
e∈E
∫ fe(x)
0
c¯e(z) + we(fe(x), pe)dz.
This means that if cost functions are monotonic and dif-
ferentiable, as they are in our case, a solution exists and
is essentially unique, i.e., all TLUE solutions have the
same social cost.
4 Experimental evidence
To verify the correctness of our assumptions over the cost
functions in real-world cases, we have set up a SUMO
simulation reproducing traffic journey over two horizon-
tal edges with a junction between them, where the first
edge was 500m long and the second edge was 50m long.
The cost of the journey is taken as the total travel
time and the congestion, x, on an edge is the average
number of cars that are present during the time a car
is on the edge. Each simulation ran for 20000 timesteps
with the same arrival distribution of cars.
Firstly, we had to find a compatible cost function for
the journey that would occur if there was no traffic light
at the junction. The affine cost function determined from
the simulation was c¯(x) = 0.4x + 43.9.
The following tests were conducted to analyse the re-
lationship between the waiting time we and the traffic
light cycle {ter, teg}. In each simulation there is fixed 3
second amber cycle to allow cars breaking time before
a phase change. As discussed, if the amber light is af-
ter a green light then this is added to the green cycle
time, otherwise, it is added to the red cycle time. For
example, a cycle that is red for 17 seconds, then amber
for 3 seconds, green for 17 seconds and finally amber for
3 seconds would be written as ter = 20, t
e
g = 20. Any
fixed traffic light cycle can be described through the to-
tal cycle time Te = t
e
r + t
e
g and the proportion of red
time in a cycle pe =
ter
ter+t
e
g
. We assume that Te belongs
within some bounds to avoid scenarios where no car is
allowed through at a traffic light, restricting the waiting
time function to finite values. We compared the effects
of changing these two variables on the cost functions and
waiting times where the cost function of the journey can
be written in the following form:
c(x) = c¯(x) + w(x, T, p).
Figure 2 plots the cost functions for a number of sim-
ulations. Each line represents the cost function found
from linear regression of the data points. Lines are
coloured using the p values to indicate the correlation
between waiting time and red cycle proportion.
From the simulations without a traffic light, we have
c¯(x) = 0.4x + 44. Once a traffic light was added,
we collected the simulated data and used linear regres-
sion to find the waiting time functions. For example,
for the cycle 20 seconds red and 20 seconds green we
have T = 40 p = 12 and the simulation results were
c(x) = 4.4x − 9 = c¯(x) + 4x − 53. Hence, the waiting
time coefficient dependent on congestion was 4, and the
time independent of congestion was −53.
The waiting time coefficients were divided into either
dependent or independent of congestion. The time de-
pendent on congestion, shown in Figure 3 (left side),
follows an exponential distribution whereas the time in-
dependent of congestion, shown in Figure 3 (right side),
only follows an exponential distribution until a thresh-
old value of red proportion and is then linear. This may
be a result of acceleration constraining movement. After
a threshold of 85% red time, the waiting time increases
significantly. This, observe, makes the cost function not
continuous over p ∈ [0, 1], in general. However, it is safe
to assume that in real traffic light systems none will have
a cycle with more than 85% red time. So, we have that
for every e ∈ E where there exists a traffic light, the pro-
portion of red time is bounded pe ≤ p+ < 1 for models
with finite waiting time. Finally, we remark that there
was no evidence to suggest a correlation between waiting
time and T (see Figure 2).
For our simulated network, the expected cost of the
journey can be written as a function that is continuous
and nondecreasing in x, as required.
c(x) = c¯(x) + (0.12e6.12p + 0.16)x− 10.51e3.05p + 14.51
where c¯(x) = 0.4x + 44 and p < 0.85.
5 Braess’ paradox and traffic lights
It is clear that changing traffic light cycles has an im-
pact on the routing choices of drivers. In this section,
we show that ‘biased’ traffic lights can force optimal or
suboptimal solutions. To see this suppose that there ex-
ists a traffic light at a node v if there are at least two
edges entering v and consider the directed Wheatstone
graph with a traffic light as in Figure 4. We denote the
presence of a traffic light by a square node. We can write
the cost functions for the edges as follows:
ce1(x) =c¯e1(x) ce4(x) =c¯e4(x)
ce2(x) =c¯e2(x) + we2(x, p) ce5(x) =c¯e5(x)
ce3(x) =c¯e3(x) + we3(x, 1− p)
Assume moreover a TLUE x where fe1(x) = x, fe2(x) =
d− x, fe3(x) = x− y, fe4(x) = y and fe5(x) = d− y.
If we increase p it causes we2 to decrease, therefore
d − x will increase. In addition, we3 increases, hence,
x− y decreases. By increasing p to a large value we can
increase the costs of using the central edge to make its
use undesirable to drivers. Suppose that w(x, 1) = ∞.
Then combining large p with the congestion costs from
the Braess example (as in Figure 4) limits players to
the subgame where the social optimum solution is the
TLUE.
Contrastingly, if we reduce p then we3 decreases which
causes x − y to increase. Furthermore, we2 increases,
hence, d−x decreases. For very low values of p combined
with the Braess example cost functions, the TLUE here
is for the players to all use the strategy {e1, e3, e5}.
Figure 2: Simulated affine cost functions are the expected journey time found from regressions of simulated data points with
a variety of values of p ∈ [0, 1] and T ∈ [40, 120]. There is a clear correlation between the proportion of red light in a cycle p
and the expected travel times (left side). The length of the cycle time T showed no correlation to journey times (right side).
Figure 3: Waiting time dependent (left side) and independent (right side) of edge congestion as a function of p. The waiting
time dependent of congestion is exponential as a function of the proportion of red time. The waiting time independent of
congestion was not continuous on p ∈ [0, 1]. For values of p ∈ [0, 0.85] the data fits an exponential function.
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Figure 4: The Wheatstone network with a single traffic light.
By adding only one traffic light into the Wheatstone
network, we have shown that changing the proportions
of red and green time of the traffic light can induce
routing inefficiencies, or indeed, reduce the effects of
Braess’ paradox can be caused by traffic lights. Con-
sequently, the traffic light cycles can be used either to
force more socially optimal outcomes or to enable poor
routing choices. This example shows the importance of
traffic light cycles in urban areas as a tool to reduce con-
gestion.
We know from Theorem 1 that a two-terminal network
is subject to Braess’ paradox if it is not series-parallel. In
order to reduce the effects of Braess’ paradox, we must
thus enforce the use of a subnetwork which is unaffected
by Braess’ paradox. In turn, in order to do that, we must
find a set of “undesirable” edges to “remove” so that the
new network does not suffer from Braess’ paradox. There
are multiple ways of defining such a set, and we wish to
determine the one of minimal size such that it is possible
to deter the use of the edges through traffic lights.
Proposition 2. For any two-terminal network that suf-
fers from Braess’ paradox, there exists a set of traffic
light cycles (pe)e∈E which can be combined with the net-
work to remove Braess’ paradox.
O D
Figure 5: In this network, the dashed lines need to be re-
moved in order for immunity to Braess’ paradox. The opti-
mal allocation of peˆ ≤ p+ does not have immunity to Braess’
paradox.
Proof. Find the maximal subgraph of G which is series
parallel, Gˆ = (V,E\Eˆ). For any edge eˆ ∈ Eˆ there must
exist a traffic light. (This is true since in order for the
edge not to be added in series or in parallel, it must be
formed from existing nodes. The in-degree of the node
must already be one, so by adding a non-series parallel
edge we must have a traffic light at the end node.) For
any such eˆ, set peˆ = 1. For any edge e ∈ E\Eˆ, set
pe =
1
vin−veˆ for vin−veˆ > 1 and pe = 0 otherwise, where
veˆ is the number of edges that end at v that belong to Eˆ.
By construction, the network Gˆ is series-parallel, hence,
is immune to Braess’ paradox.
Proposition 2 shows that any graph can be made im-
mune to Braess’ paradox by essentially closing roads by
enforcing infinite waiting times on edges which tempt
players to choose suboptimal routes. However, this re-
sult is highly theoretical. In Section 4, we have shown
that in real-world cases there are restrictions on the max-
imum and minimum possible values of p due to the con-
straints of finite waiting times. Therefore, in real-life
scenarios we may not be able to achieve immunity from
Braess’ paradox through traffic light bias, only reduce
its impact. We now suggest that this improvement is
restricted by the maximal in-degree of a node. To see
this, consider the network in Figure 5.
In order to quantify the effects of implementing a traf-
fic light, let us calculate the impact traffic light cycles
have on altering the social cost of the equilibrium. Con-
sider the cost functions from Figure 4 with d = 1. To
find the socially optimum solution we must solve the fol-
lowing minimisation problem:
min
x,y
[x2 + (1− x) + (1− x)w(1− x, p)
+ (x− y)w(x− y, 1− p) + y + (1− y)2]
where x ∈ [0, 1] and y ≤ x. Suppose the waiting func-
tions are of the simplest exponential form: w(x, p) =
x(ep − 1). Note that the waiting time here is always fi-
nite, i.e. realistic. We use the Lagrangian method to
solve for optimal x and y.
L(x, y, λ) =x2 + (x− y)2(e1−p − 1) + (1− x)2(ep − 1)
+ y + (1− y)2 − λ(y − x)
Figure 6: Social cost of TLUE and social optimum on the
Wheastone network with a traffic light. The equilibrium costs
are strictly less than the same network without a traffic light
due to the altered routing behaviours.
dL
dx
=2x+ 2(x− y)(e1−p − 1)− 2(1− x)(ep − 1)− λ = 0
dL
dy
=− 2(x− y)(e1−p − 1) + 1 + 2(1− y) + λ = 0
dL
dλ
=y − x ≤ 0 λ(y − x) = 0
If x 6= y, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are not solvable.
If x = y then we get that x = y = e
p
1+ep . This tells us that
at the social optimum, no players use the middle edge.
For p = 0 we get the social optimum of x = y = 12 (the
same solution as the case without traffic lights). Figure 6
shows that the social cost functions of user equilibria and
social optima are strictly increasing in p, so by choosing
p as low as possible we still reduce the costs of the best
possible routing.
The TLUE never reaches the social optimum cost since
the waiting time function is finite, so there are always
some players using the middle edge. This property does
not conincide with the case when p = 0, so again we see
that there needs to be implemented some bounds on p for
realistic behaviours of the game: 0 < p− ≤ p ≤ p+ < 1.
The UE cost of Braess’ example where there exist no
traffic lights (see Figure 1) is 2. The traffic light is able
to reduce the effects of selfish routing for all p < 1. By
including a traffic light, the cost of the TLUE is up to
24% lower than without. Even with the additional con-
straint on p to adhere to its bounds 1−p+ < p < p+, the
social cost is reduced by 22%. This suggests that by po-
sitioning traffic lights at the end of edges which are not
series-parallel, the costs of selfish routing are reduced.
The price of anarchy belongs to [1.07, 1.15] for this game
whereas once the traffic light and waiting time cost func-
tions are removed the price of anarchy is, as well known
(see e.g., [Roughgarden, 2005]), strictly greater: 43 .
6 Conclusions
It is possible to model traffic lights in a routing game
using expected waiting time functions where the equi-
libria of such games exist and are essentially unique.
The proportion of red time at a traffic light influences
routing choices. The waiting time functions behave non-
monotonically past an upper bound value of the red light
time in a cycle. It is therefore important to include
a maximum red time length in intelligent traffic light
models to minimise any unpredictable behaviour.
By just altering the traffic light cycles, people’s rout-
ing behaviour can change and alter the social cost of the
equilibria significantly. Traffic lights can act as a cen-
tral decision-maker to remove the effects of noncoopera-
tive selfish routing. By allowing for infinite waiting time
functions, we can theoretically use traffic lights to make
any network immune to Braess’ paradox. Implementa-
tion of this is not compatible with the upper bounds for
the proportion of red time in a traffic light cycle.
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